What if Martin Luther King Jr. had not been Assassinated?

Many figures throughout history stand as beacons of hope, courage, and change. Among them, Martin Luther King Jr. shines as a luminary of the Civil Rights Movement, whose vision of equality and justice resonates across generations.

However, his life was abruptly cut short by an assassin's bullet on April 4, 1968. Yet, what if that tragic event had never occurred? What if Martin Luther King Jr. had lived to see his dreams fully realized?

Terry Bailey considers.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. at the Civil Rights March on Washington, D.C. in August 1963.

This speculative exploration delves into the alternate reality where his assassination never happened, pondering the impact on civil rights, social justice, and the course of American history.

In a world where Martin Luther King Jr. survives, the struggle for civil rights would undoubtedly continue, albeit with a different trajectory. King's leadership and moral authority would have provided ongoing inspiration and guidance to activists and advocates. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act, might have faced less resistance and achieved broader implementation under King's advocacy.

His unwavering commitment to nonviolent protest and civil disobedience could have continued to shape the tactics and strategies employed by movements for racial equality. However, King's continued presence would not have necessarily ensured a smooth process and progress.

The Civil Rights Movement was a complex tapestry of diverse voices and ideologies, and internal tensions were already emerging before his death. Disputes over strategy, goals, and priorities probably would have intensified in the absence of a unifying figure like King. Nevertheless, his ability to bridge divides and rally support across racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines could have helped navigate these challenges and keep the movement focused on its core principles.

Beyond civil rights

Without the abrupt end to his life, Martin Luther King Jr. would have had the opportunity to further refine and expand his message beyond civil rights. Already, he had begun to address issues of economic inequality, advocating for economic justice and the eradication of poverty. In the years following 1968, King might have intensified his efforts to address systemic injustices that perpetuated economic disparities among racial minorities.

His vision of a "Beloved Community," where all people live in harmony and mutual respect, might have inspired broader movements for social change. Issues such as environmental justice, LGBTQ+ rights, and global peace could have found resonance within King's moral framework, broadening the scope of his influence and legacy.

The political landscape of the United States would have been significantly influenced by King's continued presence. His moral authority and charismatic leadership could have propelled him into a more prominent political role, whether as an elected official or as a trusted advisor to policymakers. King's advocacy for voting rights and political participation might have led to increased voter turnout among marginalized communities, reshaping electoral dynamics and empowering historically disenfranchised groups.

Moreover, King's influence could have extended beyond domestic affairs to shape America's foreign policy and international relations. His commitment to nonviolence and diplomacy might have influenced the nation's approach to conflicts abroad, fostering a more humanitarian and cooperative stance on issues of global significance.

Activism

In a world where Martin Luther King Jr. survived, his legacy would have continued to inspire generations to come. His speeches, writings, and actions would remain touchstones of moral courage and social activism, studied and celebrated in schools, universities, and communities worldwide.

The annual observance of Martin Luther King Jr. Day, (officially the Birthday of Martin Luther King Jr. the federal holiday in the United States observed on the third Monday of January each year), might have taken on even greater significance, serving as a call to action for social justice and equality.

However, the passage of time might also have obscured some aspects of King's legacy, as historical figures are often subject to reinterpretation and selective memory. Controversies and criticisms that arose during his lifetime might have resurfaced or evolved in unforeseen ways, challenging the prevailing narratives. Yet, amidst the complexities and ambiguities of history, Martin Luther King Jr.'s enduring impact on American society and beyond would remain undeniable.

Conclusion

The hypothetical scenario of Martin Luther King Jr. surviving his assassination invites reflection on the enduring significance of his life and legacy. While we can never know with certainty what might have transpired in such an alternate reality, we can draw inspiration from his example and continue the work of building a more just and equitable world.

As we commemorate his achievements and honor his memory, let us also recommit ourselves to the unfinished work of realizing his dream. For in the words of Martin Luther King Jr. himself, "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."

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The Modern Greek State: 1950–1974 – The Road to Dictatorship and Retreat

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. This article starts by looking at what happened as the Greek Civil War ended and the 1950s emerged, and ends by looking at the years of dictatorship – and the loss of part of Cyprus. Thomas P. Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here, part 5 on the issues of clientelism here, and part 6 on World War2 and a new divide here.

The leaders of the 1967 Greek military coup d'état. They are Stylianos Pattakos, Georgios Papadopoulos, and Nikolaos Makarezos. Source: Available here.

I Introduction: Power pillars after the civil war

Throughout the civil war and after that Greek remained a parliamentary democracy. To a certain extend and especially during the years of the fighting this was because of the need of the Americans and the British to appear to the public as supporters of a democratic regime that faced an imminent communist threat. Three very general political groupings could be distinguished that corresponded to right-center-left wings: The Right wing of the political spectrum was covered by the traditional anti-Venizelism, loyal to the throne and anti-communist. The Center had its historical roots in the Venizelist space that distinguished it form the right and was opposed to the communist left. The Left included non-communist components but was dominated by the Communist Party. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 17-22)

The latter was declared illegal, as post war Greece was an anti-communist cold war democracy pursuing the political and social exclusion of the Left, and thousands of its former partisans were imprisoned on remote Greek islands or excluded from state jobs. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Nevertheless, Greece never reached Stalinist Russia and there was much more freedom in the country compared to Franco’s Spain or Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, the Left had the opportunity to participate in the political arena with the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera – EDA), a party whose control from the communists was an open secret, achieving good elections results. Furthermore, clientelism and the powerful and ubiquitous networks of the Greek family were always present and managed to mitigate the effects of political and social exclusion. It was not unusual then for leftists to be recruited into the public sector, from which they were officially excluded, through family political networks. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), pp. 169-170) (Heneage, 2021, p. 206)  

Within this framework there were also extra-parliamentary pillars of power. First, there was the palace and the king. The role of king George II was reconfirmed with the referendum of 1946, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) but he died soon after in April 1947 and was replaced by his son Paul. The palace would try to shape the political scenery according to its likings. This led the king to consecutive ruptures with all political wings and, from time to time, with the Army. (Rizas, 2008, p. 24)

The Army was the winner of the civil war and foremost agent of anti-communism. Although in the past the officers looked for political patronage with only some autonomous action (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), by 1949 the Army was a well-organized and well-equipped mechanism with war experience and confidence. It felt a kind of detachment and contempt for parliamentarism, although the stance of individual officers against the palace, on foreign policy issues and on certain parties and politicians varied. In any case, the real possibilities of the political establishment to control the military apparatus were small. (Rizas, 2008, p. 25) 

Finally, there was the American factor. For Washington, Greece had critical geopolitical interest as part of the ‘northern frieze’, together with Turkey and Iran, that would prevent soviet access to warm waters in the Near and Middle East. Thus, they favored a political establishment consistent with this end. The political parties in Greece on the other hand, although with gradations among them and except for the communist Left, favored the integration to the US sphere of influence as a deterrent to the ‘threat from the North’, where traditional enemies, like Bulgaria, now joined the communist bloc. As they lacked the means for the country’s recovery, essential for their survival, and the retention of sufficient military force, American help was essential. The fragmentation of the political forces facilitated further the American intervention, but occasionally the latter faced strong political movements. Thus, the USA was neither the all-powerful factor that steadily and unimpededly shaped the scene at will, as a popular narrative of part of the historiography and political-journalistic literature claims, but nor the non-participating observer of Greek politics, without interests and perceptions, as they claimed from time to time in Washington. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 32-34)

II The way to dictatorship

Attempts for reconciliation (1949 – 1952)

It is only natural that the Greeks should look for reconciliation amongst the rivaling parties after the end of the civil war. The Americans wanted the ratification of the end of the war and the reconciliation of the main political factions to come through the people’s vote. A new, more representative parliament, compared to that running the country during the civil war, was necessary. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172) In fact, it was time for the struggle to become political and mostly economical with significant means for the necessary reconstruction arising from bold cuts in military spending. (Rizas, 2008, p. 64) American influence was ensured as foreign aid at the time covered 90,6 % of the deficit in the balance of foreign payments, 80,7 % of public spending for the reconstruction and 56,7 % of the Greek fiscal deficit. (Rizas, 2008, p. 119) Thus, the elections took place on the 5th of March 1950 using the electoral system of proportional representation.

The elections showed a clear lead for the Center – Left parties. This adds to the controversy over their decision to abstain from the 1946 elections, after which the civil war entered its most lethal phase. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Charged with the mission of implementing a policy that would seek to overcome the consequences of the civil war and emphasize on reconstruction and income redistribution, they failed to stand up to the occasion yet again though. Their division into several groups spreading from the Center – Left to the Center – Right (Nikolaos Plastiras, Georgios Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios, were leading the most important ones), hostile to one another, rendered cooperation difficult in matters such as that of general amnesty and the policy of leniency towards those exiled, imprisoned (including death row inmates) or prosecuted as communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172)

Things were further perplexed by international developments at that time. The Korean War (25th June 1950) completely changed the perceptions and priorities of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 75) The Marshall plan was to expire in 1952 (Rizas, 2008, p. 60) and American support was reduced from 250 million dollars in 1950-51 to mere 84 million in 1952-53. At the same time there was no talk anymore for a cut in military spending that took 10 % of the national income in 1951. (Rizas, 2008, p. 123) This led to a complete revision of an ambitious 4 year program elaborated in 1948 aiming at the exploitation of the national water and mineral resources for electrification, which was a prerequisite for the country’s industrialization as a means of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The Americans were not favoring industrialization anymore suggesting alternatives for economic growth, like tourism. This created resentment in political circles and the public opinion, which perceived the American policy as imposing colonial terms on the Greek economy. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 120 - 121) In fact, the most famous monography on the development of Greek heavy industry at the time came from the communist Dimitris Batsis. (Batsis, 1977 (11th Edition)) Its author, together with 3 more members of the communist party (Nikos Beloyiannis, Ilias Argyriadis and Nikos Kaloumenos), were executed as spies in March 1952, as the anti-communist vigilance intensified again. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 174)

In a nutshell, the Cold War climate after 1950 imposed that the development effort would have to be undertaken and paid for with mostly Greek resources, making the stabilization of the economy by any possible means, while at the same time maintaining a high level of military forces and spending, paramount. (Rizas, 2008, p. 120 ) Thus, the Centrist governments implemented a strict stabilization program, which cost them electoral losses and paved the way for the ascent of the conservative Right to power. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 125 - 129)

The conservative Right to power (1952 – 1963)

Alexandros Papagos

The dominant figure of the Right was field marshal Alexandros Papagos. Coming from the high Athenian society, he was Chief of the Army General Staff at the beginning of the Greco-Italian war of 1940 and later assumed the rank of major General of the Army. He was arrested during the occupation and sent to a concentration camp in Germany until 1945. The military stalemate of 1948, during the civil war, was the reason for the return to his duties as commander in chief. In this capacity he managed to close the war against the communists victoriously and received the title of field marshal in October 1949 at the age of 66. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 60 - 61)

Papagos’ profile obviously matched the political climate of the time as he was surely anti-communist and further posed as an alternative to a political establishment in crisis. (Rizas, 2008, p. 93) Nevertheless, a dictatorship was not an option for Washington. The Americans would not object though, if Papagos ran for office and was elected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 79) To this end he had to resign from his post, which he did in May 1951. His resignation caused reactions in the Army and members of the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatkon - IDEA), a secret military organization, which, according to its Constitution, ‘should establish a dictatorship if the political leaders were unable to protect the country’s national interests, namely to contain communism’, (Arvanitopoulos, 1991, p. 99)(Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 208-209) occupied the General Staff building, the radio station and other places in Athens. The movement ended within a day by the intervention of Papagos, which proves that at the time of his resignation he was in full control of the armed forces. (Rizas, 2008, p. 83) (Tsoucalas, 2020, σ. 209) Furthermore, characteristic of the Army’s power and independence was the fact that grace was granted to those involved in the movement and the matter was closed there. (Rizas, 2008, p. 90) This came to the dismay of the palace as the king particularly disliked the fact that Papagos was not willing to go into politics under his tutelage. (Rizas, 2008, p. 82) He even tried to bring the Army under his influence after Papagos’ resignation, but this met the opposition of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 84, 85, 95, 99 - 100)

Nevertheless, one thing on which there was a consensus within the power establishment at that time, with the exceptions of the Left, was the need to join a collective security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 112) The difference was that for the Center this was perceived as an opportunity to deter the threat from the communist countries in the north with reduced military spending (Rizas, 2008, p. 122), whereas Papagos believed that Greece could ensure its inclusion in the allied planning only if it maintained a significant military capability. (Rizas, 2008, p. 109) In any case, Greece’s participation in the Korean War, in response to the United Nations appeal for assistance, (Wikipedia, 2023) was included in this context, and the country finally joined the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with Turkey, in February 1952. (Rizas, 2008, p. 117) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 213-214)

Papagos’ party, the ‘Greek Rally’, came to power a few months later in November, winning 49.2 % of the votes and 247 out of 300 seats in the parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 130) His predominance was facilitated by the fact that the elections were in this case conducted using a majoritarian electoral system. In fact, the changes of the electoral system in a way to facilitate the formation of strong one-party governments away from collaboration is a characteristic of the parliamentary system of Modern Greece that remains to this day. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 200) This tactic obviously reinforces the phenomena of division and the client state. The result of EDA (9,6 %) confirmed the existence of a hard core of communists, but the party was left out of parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 131)

This did not go unnoticed by Papagos, who established a bureaucracy of ‘national security’ imbued with anticommunism, whose activity would normally remain opaque. The Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion – KYP) was established in May 1953. (Rizas, 2008, p. 132) He also completed Greece’s integration into the Atlantic security system with the bilateral Greek – American agreement on granting military bases to the USA in October 1953. While the agreement is linked to NATO’s strategy, the operation of the bases was controlled exclusively by the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 162) Further concessions to the Americans included the use of the Greek road and rail network by the American armed forces, low fees and tax exemption for the American activities, and the granting of US military and civilian personnel the right of separate jurisdiction. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 216)

Papagos’ government made an opening to Europe as well, in view also of the reluctance of the Americans to finance the Greek development program, as we saw before. The outstanding pre-war public debt, whose settlement was not allowed by Greek public finances, resulted in the creation of the European credit mechanism. The Greek government submitted specific projects to foreign governments, which they undertook to finance indirectly or directly, often in the form of export guarantees. From now on, West Germany will become Greece’s most important economic partner. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163)

In the field of foreign policy, the minister of foreign affairs Stefanopoulos signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey in February 1953 followed by a military agreement in August 1954. The Balkan Pact was perceived as a way for the Western allies to bring Yugoslavia into their sphere of influence in case of Soviet aggression. (Wikipedia, 2023)The undertaking was short-lived though after Tito’s reconciliation with post-Stalinist Soviet Union and the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 216-217) The latter arose after an unofficial referendum on the island in 1950 that called for a unification with Greece (Wikipedia, 2023). Nevertheless, whereas previous governments avoided raising the issue as there were other priorities, e.g. joining NATO, and British opposition was fierce, (Rizas, 2008, p. 166) Papagos worked more intensively on it. As we have seen, Great Britain obtained Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire and by 1950 the island was ruled by the British for almost 70 years. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 217-218) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

For Papagos and most of the Greeks unification with Cyprus was a matter characterized by strong emotional and psychological charge. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167) Although the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign practically put an end to Greece’s concept of the ‘Great Idea’ for expansion to its ancient territories (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), here we find remnants of exactly this concept. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Facing fierce British opposition on a bilateral level, Papagos tried to internationalize the issue by appealing to the United Nations in August 1954. The appeal was fruitless as it also met the American reaction. (Rizas, 2008, p. 168) The Americans had made it clear to Athens, that Greece had to devote itself to its economic and social reconstruction and political stabilization and that its general situation did not allow for redemptive adventures. (Rizas, 2008, p. 166)They also considered the need to safeguard Cyprus’ strategic advantages for Britain, that was now on retreat from the Middle East and Suez, and the Western security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167)

The next step for Athens was to recourse to armed action. This started on the 1st of April 1955 by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA) led by the Greek Cypriot colonel of the Greek Army Georgios Grivas. (Wikipedia, 2023) The British responded to the increased Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure by bringing Greece’s arch-rival into the game. In August 1955 they convened a tripartite conference in London with the participation of Turkey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 220-221) (Rizas, 2008, p. 169)

Turkey was opposing Cyprus’ unification with Greece for strategic reasons. It did not want the completion of a chain of islands enclosing the Turkish coast from the northern Aegean to the south. To this end it used the Turkish Cypriot minority that made up 18 % of the island’s population. The Turkish position does not accept minority status for the Turkish Cypriots and considers that their presence should be equal in the management of the affairs of the island. In fact, in 1955-56 Ankara went through a maximalist phase requiring either the continuation of the British rule or the return of the island to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 167 - 168) Thus, the tripartite conference failed completely, because of the unbridgeable approaches of the participants. To make things worse for the Greeks, the Greek minority in Constantinople suffered a pogrom because of the tension. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 221) (Wikipedia, 2023)

The US and British stance on the Cyprus issue caused the dissatisfaction of the Greek public opinion, including that of the Right press. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 222) The Left saw an opportunity to cause a rift in pro-Atlantic perceptions and in the nexus of international and internal arrangements of the post-civil war era. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Stalin’s death in 1953 brought about a change in the rigid and dogmatic practises of the Communist Party, which would now seek cooperation with the Center-Left and Center parties on the basis of a joint effort to oust the ‘Greek Rally’ from the government. Indeed, in the municipal elections of November 1954 the joint candidates of the Center-Left and the Left clearly prevailed in the three largest cities, Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus, and showed good results in a number of other municipalities as well. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 139 - 140)

The most significant development after the municipal elections of 1954 was Papagos’ illness (he eventually died in October 1955), that created the need for his succession to the leadership of the ‘Greek Rally’ and the premiership. The case as it developed is simultaneously indicative of the structural weakness and opacity of the Greek political and party system. As there is no stable party structure and institutionalized process of intra-party functioning and leadership succession, due to the political culture and tradition that structures party organization around persons, the natural eclipse of the leading figure allows informal processes to fill the gap, in which extra-parliamentarian factors have a prominent role. (Rizas, 2008, p. 156) The result of such processes including  the extra-parliamentarian power pillars described in section I as well as interest networks formed by politicians and businessmen (see next section) resulted in Konstantinos Karamanlis taking over as prime minister. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209-212)

Konstantinos Karamanlis

Konstantinos Karamanlis is the founder of one of the few families that ruled over modern Greece (other famous ones include those of Trikoupis, Venizelos, Papandreou and Mitsotakis) significantly reducing the inclusiveness of the Greek political institutions. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) He was the minister of public works in the Papagos’ administration and his rise through the ranks of the Greek politics was quick after World War II . (Wikipedia, 2023) Karamanlis had the support of the palace (Rizas, 2008, p. 145) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209, 232) and king Paul gave him the mandate to form a government on the 5th of October 1955. (Rizas, 2008, p. 160) For the Americans, that after Papagos’ death turned to the king, who had the institutional capacity to be a factor of anti-communism continuity (Rizas, 2008, p. 152), this was a welcome development. The Left was on the rise again (see above) and the Americans were interested in the retainment of the Right in power (Rizas, 2008, p. 145), although the armed forces constituted a backup security force for the political and social establishment in case of exhaustion of the parliamentary means. (Rizas, 2008, p. 172) The British embassy was in agreement. (Rizas, 2008, p. 144)

This foreign consent was interpreted by the opposition press as the result of Karamanlis’ unpopular opinion referring to the need for a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) The fact was that there was a revision of the British strategic needs in Cyprus. London had concluded that to fulfill British commitments in the Middle East it was sufficient to maintain military bases in Cyprus rather than rule over the entire island. (Rizas, 2008, p. 241)The British made it clear that the Cyprus issue now depended very much on Turkish perceptions and sensitivities, which had to be taken into account as a priority, if the Western powers did not want to alienate a necessary ally in the critical region of the Middle East. (Rizas, 2008, p. 239)

Eventually, the idea of unification with Greece was given up and Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on the 16th of August 1960. The organization of the new state was based on the London and Zurich agreements of February 1959. (Wikipedia, 2022) These were met with displeasure in Greece, also by a portion of the officers corps, as the position of the Turkish – Cypriots was strengthened and the new state would operate under international and constitutional restrictions that contradicted the right of the majority to direct Cypriot affairs as they wished. In fact, the content of the agreements was considered roughly equivalent to national concession, abandoning the ideal of the union. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 233, 244) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 225) The leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou pointed out that with the London and Zurich agreements it was the first time that Turkey was returning to territory it had lost after the establishment of the modern Greek state. (Rizas, 2008, p. 245) Greece was on the retreat.

Karamanlis’ attempt to put the Cyrpus issue ‘on the self’ was done in order to manage to deal with the financial problems as a priority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) In fact, as minister of public works he had already won the admiration of the US Embassy for the efficiency with which he built road infrastructure and administered American aid programs. (Wikipedia, 2023) Furthermore, his premiership initiated the beginning of a period, that extended well into the 1970s, in which GDP grew nearly 7 % a year and per capita income trebled. It wasn’t far short of the German postwar miracle. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Karamanlis’ administration also pursued the association with the European Economic Community and the relevant agreement was signed in Athens in July 1961. (Rizas, 2008, p. 248)

Nevertheless, the Greek economic development of the 1950s and 1960s was based on foreign support (also in the form of tourism), that did not favor the industrialization of the country, (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 184) shipping and state intervention. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 190-191) (Rizas, 2008, p. 257) Favorable arrangements with Greek and foreign businessmen repeatedly provoked discussions of ‘colonial-style’ contracts, while the state’s capabilities (i) in selecting ‘partners’ to lease state-owned enterprises or (ii) to lend to commercial and industrial activities from state-controlled banks are such that they have certainly created networks of public and private interests (Rizas, 2008, pp. 258 - 259)starting a tradition that continues to this day. In fact, the Governor of the Bank of Greece at that time Xenophon Zolotas criticized the mentality of the Greek ‘entrepreneur class’ and the failure of the banking system to work against this mentality aiming at the hoarding of profits or the acquisition of consumer goods rather than the use of these profits for productive investments. (Rizas, 2008, p. 260) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 188)    

It is then not inexplicable that from 1951 to 1963 405 thousand Greeks left the country in search for better luck elsewhere. Actually, the annual remittances to their families back home reached 173 million dollars in 1963  contributing also to the country’s development. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 191) By 1980 immigration would exceed 1 million, that is about a quarter of Greece’s active workforce. (Eleftheratos, 2015, p. 182) (Heneage, 2021, p. 204)Thus, the country continued to foster non-inclusive political and financial institutions, as discussed also previously (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021), which according to Acemoglu and Robinson are characteristic of a failed state. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)

Karamanlis and the Right was also accused, not unjustly, of authoritarianism and oppression. After his appointment as a prime minister he reorganized the ‘Greek Rally’ as ‘National Radical Union’ (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi -ERE), that concluded the transformation of the old anti-Venizelist faction to a conservative party of the post-war era, (Rizas, 2008, p. 174) and asked for the affirmation of the king’s choice through the public vote in February 1956. This was the first time that the Greek women were granted with voting rights. (Rizas, 2008, p. 179) He won only thanks to a carefully chosen electoral system that gave him 165 seats in the parliament with 47,4 % of the votes against the Center-Left alliance that gathered 48,1 % but only 132 seats. This immediately raised issues of political legitimation for the government. (Rizas, 2008, p. 181) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233) Karamanlis’ position was nevertheless strengthened with another round of elections in May 1958, (Rizas, 2008, p. 204) but the result reserved the unpleasant surprise of EDA becoming the largest opposition party. (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233)Karamanlis then responded with the intensification of police action against the Left, arrests and deportations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 206) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 234) When a third round of elections came in the autumn 1961 the leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou accused Karamanlis that he used the oppressive state mechanism set up by the Right during its rule, the army and paramilitary organizations against all rival parties and ERE’s victory was seen as the product of force and fraud. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 201-207) (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) He called the people to an ‘unyielding struggle’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 239-242) that managed to mobilize the electoral base of the Center as well as wider social strata, especially since the demand for new elections was linked to other political, economic and social issues such as the Cyprus issue, unemployment, poverty and immigration described above. (Rizas, 2008, p. 269) The tension culminated with the assassination of EDA MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May 1963 by a right-wing extremist organization under conditions that made even Karamanlis wonder ‘Who in God’s name is running this country?’. The truth is that Karamanlis’ relations with the other power pillars of section I were worsening after 1961 and especially the palace, that was also targeted by the ‘unyielding struggle’, was looking for a way out of the crisis. Karamanlis was replaced as prime minister by another king’s man, Panagiotis Pipinelis, but it became obvious that the only way to relief the tensions was free elections.  These took place in November 1963 and Papandreou’s ‘Centre Union’ (Enosi Kentrou – EK) removed Karamanlis’ ERE from the government. The twelve-year rule of the Right had ended. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 242-245)

The short-lived government of the Center (1963 – 1965)

The Center won, but the majority in Parliament was small (42% of the votes and 138 seats against ERE’s 39.4% and 132 seats) (Rizas, 2008, p. 284) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 245) and the reaction of the, much closer to the Right, Army to the result of the elections unknown. Thus, Papandreou avoided extensive interventions in the latter at this phase and sought new elections, to obtain an independent majority in the Parliament. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 285, 292) Indeed, the Army remained in the barracks and Centre Union won an overwhelming majority of 52,7% of the votes and 171 seats (out of 300 in total) in the elections of February 1964. (Rizas, 2008, p. 293) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 247)

Significant changes in the social stratification of the country had occurred since the last government of the Center. The economic conditions described above did not cause only external but internal immigration as well. Whereas in 1958 the ratio of rural to urban income per capita was just over half (220 to 437 dollars), by 1964 it was significantly less (282 to 621). (Rizas, 2008, p. 295) No wonder then that the rural dwellers sought for a better fortune in the cities. The urban population increased from 37.7% in 1951 to 43% ten years later with another 13% living in semi-urban areas. 62.7% of this increase was absorbed by the city of Athens. By 1961 Greece’s capital had a population bigger than the total urban population of the rest of the country and was established as the most important center of the socio – economic life. It absorbed more than 50% of those working in the industry, received 80% of the country’s imports, paid 75% of the direct and 65% of the indirect taxation, the income of its population was 40% higher than the average national income, bought more than 50% of the daily newspaper sheets, had the highest amount of hospital beds, 85% of qualified doctors and housed the bulk of those working in the public sector. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 181 - 182) This dominance of Athens remains to this day.

Papandreou increased the agricultural subsidies from 2.6 to 4.4% of the state budget, (Rizas, 2008, p. 297) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 250) but this could do little to reverse the fact that Greece had also entered the stage of mass urban societies when the spirit of the 1960s was spreading through the western world. (Wikipedia, 2023)Combined with an ongoing economic boom, under the name ‘Trente Glorieuses’ in France (Wikipedia, 2023) or ‘Miracolo Economico’ in Italy (Wikipedia, 2023), this drove the demand for increased consumption and services through an income redistribution. Thus, Greece could not remain unaffected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 299) 

Indeed, EK raised the daily wages, pensions, instituted vacations pay equal to ½ of the monthly salary and generally aimed at boosting the demand as a driver of accelerating economic growth. The result was that the increase in consumption exceeded the productive capacity of the domestic industry. In 1965, for the first time the value of industrial output exceeded the value of agricultural output. Thus, the Greek bourgeoisie also had every reason to be satisfied with the economic policy of EK during this period. Protective tariffs were in place, the credit process was simplified, prices were kept at stable heights and economic growth reached 8%. Business was going well, and profits were high. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 250 - 251) (Rizas, 2008, pp. 297 - 298)

The liberal, redistributive, and developmental spirit of the time was also present in Papandreou’s highly popular educational reform. He increased the time of compulsory education from six to nine years and established messes in elementary schools and scholarships for high schools to facilitate the access of children from the weaker social classes to them. To this end, the vernacular was also established as an equal language with the so called ‘clean’ (kathareuousa), that was based on the ancient Greek language and was mostly used by the elitist social strata. Ancient texts were also now to be taught translated in high school. The tuition and examination fees in higher education were abolished and a new university was established in Patras. Plans for two more in Epirus and Crete were laid. Finally, the Pedagogical Institute was also created, responsible for applied educational research, the creation of syllabi and the renewal of textbooks. (Rizas, 2008, σσ. 301 - 303) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 252)    

In foreign policy, once again, the Cyprus issue was dominant. Here Athens did not have the control of the developments and Papandreou was particularly worried about the unbound and uncontrolled initiatives of the Greek-Cypriot leader and first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 312) The latter announced in December 1963 his intention to proceed with a unilateral revision of the constitution in order to limit the extensive veto rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 307) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 226) This caused tensions and armed conflicts between the two communities that culminated to the dispatch of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the island in spring 1964. This marked the consolidation of a situation rather favourable to the Greek-Cypriot side, which in the meantime prevailed in 95% of the island’s territory and had under its full control the state apparatus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 310) Nevertheless, the bombardment, in August 1964, of Greek-Cypriot positions on the islands by the Turkish Air Force, following an attack on a Turkish-Cypriot village by the Greeks, indicated that Turkey was not going to give up its ambitions on the islands easily. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 227)

Apart from appealing to the UN, several alternatives to solve the crisis were also brought forward by the Americans and NATO going as far as the partition of the island between the two communities. The rejection of these plans by the Greek government were interpreted as the result of the influence of the prime minister’s son Andreas Papandreou. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 313 - 317)

Andreas Papandreou was an economist and former university professor in the USA. Nevertheless, he represented a more radical left wing within EK. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) This was met with scepticism by the Americans, especially after J. F. Kennedy’s assassination and the assumption of the presidency by Lyndon Johnson that marked a shift in American policy from the need for liberal openness to more traditional notions credible from the point of view of Cold War strategy. (Rizas, 2008, p. 358) Andreas was also perceived as an obstacle for the personal ambitions of many EK politicians that hoped to succeed his aged father. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) Some of these, like Konstantinos Mitsotakis (the father of today’s prime minister), had also strong reservations about the economic policy, as they considered that the capacity for further benefits of any kind had been exhausted, and the prime minister’s handlings regarding the Cyprus issue that created tension in the Greco-American relations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 345)

Thus, in spring 1965 started a sequence of events that led to the eviction of Papandreou from the premiership and are often treated as the product of conspiracy by the American factor in collaboration with the palace, where the new king Constantine II had succeeded his father Paul that died in 1964, and defectors within EK. In May, the existence of an officers’ organization under the name ASPIDA (shield) became public. (Rizas, 2008, p. 337) Its aim, according to the indictment, was the establishment of a Nasser-style dictatorship. Politicians were also, supposedly, involved among which was Andreas Papandreou. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 260) The government perceived the accusations as an attempt of the Right to purge the army of pro-government officers and contrary to his original stance Georgios Papandreou now decided to intervene. (Rizas, 2008, p. 339) His proposals, among which was to take over the ministry of national defence himself, were rejected by the king though. The prime minister felt obliged to resign. Before even submitting his resignation in writing, the king had already appointed a new government supported by ERE and dissidents (defectors) of the EK. By July 1965 Georgios Papandreou was ousted, and his son faced charges of high treason. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 261)     

The colonels come to power (1965 – 1967)

The 25 years old king Constantine had overestimated his powers. The dismissal of Papandreou was in direct opposition to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The attempt to form a government with defectors from EK was met with disdain by the Greek people. After two years of the more liberal Papandreou government the latter would now express its dismay in a dynamic way. For weeks, hundreds of thousand of people would demonstrate against the methods of the defectors and the palace. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 263 - 265)

Furthermore, the departure of the defectors from EK strengthened its more radical wing and Andreas Papandreou, who declared that: ‘The Nation’s infrastructure, transport and communication, the credit system and education must be owned by the state. In general, heavy industry should be state-owned and light industry private. There is a primary need to make efforts to limit or even eliminate heavy consumption and the import of luxury goods. It is necessary to stop the granting of monopoly privileges which help the entry of foreign capital.’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 268 - 269)Advocating national sovereignty, he also appeared skeptical of NATO and Greece’s integration into the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 391) The king was not spared from accusations of practices that exceeded the limits of constitutional monarchy and at the same time Andreas Papandreou was raising the issue of perceived American interference in Greece’s internal affairs. Finally, he argued that a fairer distribution of the national income was necessary by attacking the wealthier classes. (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) Greece’s elites had every reason to feel worried.

The army was also worried. The parliament did not lift Papandreou’s immunity for the case of ASPIDA and it was obvious that his father would give up his original stance of non-intervention in the army after that. In fact, there was a group of mid and low-level officers established in 1956 already, that exercised pressure on the respective military leadership for a coup, whenever it appeared that the Left and Center would get a majority in the parliament. The leader of this group was colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. (Rizas, 2008, p. 388)

Thus, in the 22 months that followed Georgios Papandreou’s eviction from office the Greek people remained agitated, EK strong in the electorate, Andreas Papandreou’s rhetoric radical, Greece’s elites and the Americans consequently worried and the king also feeling threatened, as his interventions had caused a revival of the issue of choice between monarchy and democracy, (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) was avoiding calling elections using government schemes supported by the Right and defectors from EK. Obviously, the margins for a parliamentary solution to the dispute had become very narrow. On the 21st of April 1967 colonel Georgios Papadopoulos’ group made their move: Dictatorship.   

III Dictatorship

In his book on the many military interventions in the Greek politics between 1916 and 1936 Thanos Veremis distinguishes them in two categories: 1) The one refers to those interventions that gained national importance and were supported by a large portion of the public. 2) The second refers to those that aimed only to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of a military faction. (Veremis, 2018, p. 280) Thus, if we were to follow the same distinction, then the military coup of 1967 belongs to the second category.  

Veremis further interprets the people’s tolerance to these regimes as disappointment from and consequently discontent for the political establishment. (Veremis, 2018, p. 279) Nevertheless, tolerance is by no means acceptance. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the repressive mechanisms of the 1967 junta cannot be ignored. The center-left and left-wing resistance organizations established immediately after the coup were quickly neutralized, and the protagonists were in many cases brutalized and tortured. The same is true for the democratic officers of the army (Rizas, 2008, p. 442)

The junta was also ad odds with the king. After all the coup did not come from the high ranking officers of the latter’s entourage, as discussed previously, and as the junta was aiming at the establishment of a permanent regime confrontation with Constantine II was inevitable. (Rizas, 2008, p. 434) In fact, on the 13th of December 1967 the king carried out a counter coup, but once again junta’s reaction was swift and Constantine found himself in exile.

There was also a wide spread belief in a large part of the population, that fed anti-Americanism for many years, that the political question could not be solved by the Greeks themselves, but by the sovereign will of the Americans, who were held responsible for imposing and maintaining the dictatorship. (Rizas, 2008, p. 443) The truth is that for Henry Kissinger, the American national security advisor, the nature of the regime was not an issue for Washington (Rizas, 2008, p. 453) as long as it identified itself with NATO and the western world and Greece remained an ally of the West in the Cold War. (Rizas, 2008, p. 432) The junta did.

Junta’s doings in the financial sector have often been the subject of controversy. During the 2010 economic crisis, for example, when the country found itself at the brink of bankruptcy and a tough program of austerity and heavy taxation was imposed on its people, public discontent against the parties working within the parliamentary system of government gave fertile ground for references to junta’s well-organized economy, which avoided thriftlessness and empowered needy social groups such as farmers. Researchers like D. Eleftheratos showed that this was a myth and stressed the devastating effects of junta’s policies on the Greek economy. (Eleftheratos, 2015)

Thus, the international oil crisis of October 1973 challenged the sustainability of the Greek model of financial growth (Rizas, 2008, pp. 351-352) and as the passing of time inevitably led to a relaxation of the police measures popular discontent was more readily expressed. Universities in particular became a permanent hotbed. (Rizas, 2008, p. 444)The revolt of the Polytechnic University in Athens in November 1973 was violently suppressed, but a group of fiercely nationalist and anti-communist officers already worried that Papadopoulos was becoming too moderate. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 446-447) The internal conflicts of the junta culminated to a coup within the coup on the 25th of November 1973, when brigadier Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos and assumed the leadership of the military regime. (Rizas, 2008, p. 474)

The final blow for the junta came a few months later during another crisis in Cyprus. It was mentioned in the previous section already that even Georgios Papandreou, whose funeral in November 1968 marked one of the first massive demonstrations against the military regime, had trouble dealing with the policies of the president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. In fact, the dispatch of an army division to Cyprus by Papandreou in 1964, apart from the increase of the Greek deterrent power on the island, was also interpreted as an attempt to increase control over Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 313) Nevertheless, the latter’s initiatives to bring Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement (Wikipedia, 2024), to side with the Arabs during the Six-Day War (Rizas, 2008, p. 480) (Wikipedia, 2024) or to order weapons from Czechoslovakia for the Cypriot armed forces (Rizas, 2008, p. 481) indicate clearly the structural divergence between the political system in Cyprus and the military regime in Greece.

Indeed, the junta worked towards the unification of Cyprus with Greece, but Makarios opposed the idea as Cyprus would then be subject to a dictatorship and, furthermore, the proposal included territorial concessions to Turkey (Rizas, 2008, p. 479), in accordance with American demands that Athens should consider the Turkish views in Cyprus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 482) This does not mean that an agreement with Turkey was reached. On the contrary, when the junta tried, unsuccessfully, to impose its views to the Turkish side at the end of 1967, the issue culminated to a Greco-Turkish crisis that eventually forced the junta to withdraw the Greek army division from the island. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 480-481) Later, in March 1970, the junta attempted to murder Makarios and eventually Ioannidis to overthrow him with a coup on the 15th of July 1974. Under the treaty of Guarantee (Wikipedia, 2024), this was the excuse that the Turks needed to justify their invasion in Cyprus 5 days later, that led to the division of the island that lasts to this day. On the 24th of July Karamanlis, in self-exile in Paris after losing the premiership in 1963 (see above), returned to Greece to form a government. The junta had fallen. 

IV Conclusion

What we have seen in this series of articles so far is that modern Greece, since its foundation, was always able to move forward. Despite the difficulties, thanks to some capable leaders, favored also by coincidence and luck, it managed to continuously develop and expand.

Thus, at the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Greece was again a completely different country. The population had largely withdrawn from the countryside and lived in two large cities, Athens, and Thessaloniki. Financially, the rural-urban gap had narrowed, and per capita income had tripled since 1964. There was an extensive service sector, whereas the industry had developed to such an extent that about 40% of exports were industrial goods. It was thus an urbanized country, with a relatively industrialized economy that in parallel to the established relation with the USA was now pursuing admission to the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 490)

Nevertheless, much of all these was done through networks of public and private interests in a way that did not allow for the exploitation of the country’s full potential for the benefit of all its people. Many sought their luck abroad or became trapped in a clientelism system sponsored by exclusive political institutions. What changed after 1974 was the influence of the army. In many cases in the past the collaboration between politicians and military officers for the seizure of power resulted in mild punishments for the latter after army interventions into politics. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Although after junta’s fall in 1974 many of its collaborators were treated mildly and were even cared for by businessmen favored by the military regime (Eleftheratos, 2015, pp. 313-322) the leading officers were now sentenced to life in prison. Indeed, after 1974 the political establishment managed to eliminate the role of the army in the political developments in Greece. Nevertheless, it remains, to a significant extend, a ‘family business’ (after 1974, 6 prime ministers came from the Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis families, for example).   

It was a matter of time then before Greece started to pay the toll for its exclusive political and financial institutions. As we saw, Georgios Papandreou’s remarks for the Cyprus issue, that the London and Zurich agreements marked, for the first time, the return of Turkey to a territory it had lost after the establishment of modern Greece, could be interpreted as an indication that Greece was going on the retreat. The invasion of the island and occupation of its north-eastern part by the Turks in July 1974 made it official. 

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References

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail. London: Profile Books ltd.

Arvanitopoulos, C. (1991). The Rise and Fall of the Greek Military Regime: 1967 - 1974. Journal of Modern Hellenism, No. 8, pp. 97 - 116 (available at https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/view/118/119).

Batsis, D. (1977 (11th Edition)). The Heavy Industry in Greece. Athens: Kedros.

Eleftheratos, D. (2015). Diddlers in Khaki, Economic 'miracles' and victims of the junta. Athens: Topos Eds. (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

Kalyvas, N. S. (2020 (3rd Edition)). Catastrophies and Triumphs, The 7 cycles of modern Greek history. Athens: Papadopoulos (in Greek, in English under the title Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know by Oxford University Press).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, March 22). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/3/22/the-modern-greek-state-19231940-the-issues-of-clientelism#.ZDj9i_ZBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, October 14). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/10/14/the-modern-greek-state-19411949-war-amp-a-new-divide

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Tsoucalas, C. (2020). The Greek Tragedy, From the liberation to the colonels. Athens: Patakis (in Greek, originally published in English by Penguin in 1969).

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Is this the Best Movie City in the US?

There are many American cities that can make a case for the being the best ‘movie city’ in America. Here, Michael Thomas Leibrandt considers whether Philadelphia is truly the best…

Don Knotts, who starred in The Shakiest Gun in the West.

“I Have a Case.” The iconic movie line delivered from Tom Hanks in the Philadelphia-based hit movie Philadelphia, thirty years ago.

When it comes to being one of the most historic movie cities in the US — well — move over Hollywood. Last month, we learned that Rocky movie series star Carl Weathers passed away peacefully at his home.

Nearly one hundred and twenty years ago, my great grandfather — a true Philadelphia born and raised — was pulled to be an extra during the filming of The Great Train Robbery in 1903. He was a railroad engineer, who happened to be in New Jersey that day, and the production needed some extras for a scene.

The Great Train Robbery, a ground-breaking silent film from Director Edwin S. Porter, was a marvel for its time. Perhaps the basis for the introduction if the plot-based film, it would give rise to the American Western. Before the end of the 20th century, The Searchers, High Noon, A Fistful of Dollars, The Magnificent Seven, and The Wild Bunch would be some of our most treasured action westerns.

Some reasons

When it comes to iconic scenes, think Philly. It’s been fourty-five years since Rocky’s iconic run through the Philly streets in Rocky II, twenty-five years since M. Night Shayamalan’s thriller The Sixth Sense included St. Augustine’s Church, and sixty-five years since Paul Newman and Robert Vaughn starred in the The Young Philadelphians.

The 2024 Oscars had plenty of Philadelphia representation, too. Jenkintown’s Bradley Cooper who was nominated for Best Actor, Best Picture, and Best Original Screenplay for Maestro. Coleman Domingo had a Best Actor nomination for Rustin, and Da’Vine Joy Randolph for Best Actress in The Holdovers, both of which are graduates of Temple University.

We made movies here from the beginning. At the beginning of America’s obsession with the motion picture industry, Lubin Manufacturing Company produced silent films from 1896–1916, and became a corporation in Philadelphia in 1902. Among the more than 3,000 films produced by Lubin were the 1912 films The Sheriff’s Mistake and The Bank Cashier.

Lubin actually purchased the Betzwood Estate, once the home of Philadelphia Brewer Joseph F. Betz, and utilized it to film what would eventually become known as “Betzwood Westerns.”

Even in the late 19th century, some veterans of the Wild West still existed. Harry Webb had been a part of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show, and those who actually had experience on a real western ranch such as Jack Wright. Jake May’s sons Harry and Jack were in charge of the saloon across the street from the Lubin studio in North Philadelphia.

The 1968 production of the film The Shakiest Gun in the West starring Don Knotts was the story of a Philadelphia dentist who travels to the frontier in 1870 and battles attacks from natives, a complete farce of a marriage proposal, and masked robbers.

In 2020, the film Concrete Cowboy told the story of the Fletcher Street Urban Riding Club, which has an over 100 year history in North Philadelphia and takes horses from a livestock auction in New Holland that are cared for in stables between North Philadelphia and West Philadelphia.

The horses are often ridden in races in “The Speedway” in Fairmount Park and also ‘The Oval’ on 15th Street. For years, the horses have been favorites among the Temple University Diamond Band.

Location/Location

According to a Kuoni, Philadelphia is the ninth most popular location for filming a movie internationally, and ranks sixth in the US. The Pennsylvania Tax Credit is a big reason why. Tax credits of 25–30% to production which spend 60% or more of their total production cost within Pennsylvania.

When I began to immersive myself in film studies in college, my Dad recalled his grandfather’s pride about once having been a brief part of a film industry production. After all, he lived in Philadelphia, a city that will forever have great film-making in its blood.

It turns out that it’s in mine, too.

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Michael Thomas Leibrandt is a historian and writer and lives and works in Abington Township, PA.

How did a British Ship with Soviet Gold Sink During World War 2?

The lend-lease program established between the Allies and the Soviet Union involved the provision of allied equipment to bolster the Soviet war effort during World War II. This aid played a crucial role in supporting the Soviets during the initial stages of the conflict because the Soviet Union’s production capability was relatively low earlier in the war. As a gesture of gratitude, the Soviets agreed to repay this assistance by sending £1.5 million sterling worth of gold to the Allies. However, tragedy struck with the sinking of the HMS Edinburgh, the vessel tasked with transporting this gold to Britain, resulting in the loss of the precious cargo.

Kyle Brett explains.

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The severely damaged stern of the HMS Edinburgh's after being torpedoed by U-456.

HMS Edinburgh’s service

Edinburgh was a town-class light cruiser that was launched on March 31, 1938. She would spend the beginning years of the war protecting convoys in the North Sea. At one point she was sent to hunt down the German Battleship Scharnhorst but was unable to locate the ship. After this Edinburgh was sent to protect convoys heading to North Africa and the Middle East.

In the middle of this term, she was sent to the Bay of Biscay to intercept the German Battleship Bismark, but the Bismark never made it to Edinburgh, meeting her fate far west of the Bay. After her travels to the Mediterranean, Edinburgh would be sent to the North Sea once again protecting convoys bound for the Soviet Union with aid from the Western allies.  She would also spend some time patrolling Iceland for German vessels. She would not see too much action here as Germans would only be hunting convoys and not patrols.

The Soviet gold

The lend-lease act was a major part of Allied cooperation during the war. Many of the pieces of equipment that the Allies would send to the Soviet Union would be put to good use. US and British planes fought at the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the mighty Katyusha rocket launchers would be loaded onto Studebaker US6 trucks and would be utilized by the Soviets throughout the war. The allied equipment made a large impact on the war and played a part in the success of the Soviets.

The Soviets would seek to send some sort of repayment to the allies, and this would be through gold. The war had kicked the Soviet industrial machine into high gear and thus their mining operations grew substantially from this. The Soviets would use gold, and other precious metals like platinum to help the allies and to pay them for the support that they had given the Soviet Union during the early part of the war. 4.5 tons of this gold would be loaded onto the HMS Edinburgh in Murmansk and sent to Britain around the top of the Scandinavian Peninsula.

Departure and first sighting

Edinburgh was the commanding escort of Convoy QP: 11, which consisted of 13 Merchant ships of various allied nationalities and 18 warships. The composition of the convoy was one cruiser: Edinburgh, six destroyers, four minesweepers, and one armed trawler. The convoy had just dropped off supplies to the Soviet Union and was making a return trip to Britain. 

On April 28, 1942, the convoy would depart the port of Murmansk headed for Britain. The next day as the convoy was traversing the North Sea they would be spotted by a German spotter plane. This plane would relay its position to the German command. They would then order all nearby U-boats to attack the convoy, as well as sending a nearby task force of 3 destroyers to intercept the convoy.

April 30, 1942

As the day progressed the calmness of the last two days was broken by two U-boats who started making attacks on the convoy. The two U-boats, U-88 and U-456, had not found any success in their attacks earlier in the day. Later in the day U-456 would make another pass on the convoy and found success with this attack. U-456 launched a spread of torpedoes at HMS Edinburgh and scored 2 hits on her. One torpedo hit the forward boiler room, crippling Edinburgh’s speed. The second torpedo smashed into the stern, blasting the entire stern of the ship off. This stern hit also destroyed the rudder and took 2 of the 4 propellers off Edinburgh. The crew closed all the bulkheads immediately which saved her from sinking after the second impact.

This concluded U-88 and U-456’s attacks on the convoy. Edinburgh would be forced to turn back to Murmansk as she was unable to make the journey back to Britain with the immense damage she had sustained. Edinburgh would be escorted by two destroyers Foresight and Forester on her journey back to port. Murmansk also had sent 8 ships to help protect and help return Edinburgh to port so she could repair.

May 1, 1942

The 3 German destroyers dispatched to intercept the convoy were Z7 Hermann Schoemann, Z24, and Z25 of destroyer group Arkits. They had orders to attack the ships of the convoy and after hearing the success of U-456’s attacks they also had orders to sink Edinburgh. There was limited visibility as there was on-and-off rain and snow. The destroyer group opened up with their guns on the convoy at 14:05.

The remaining 4 destroyers protecting the convoy raced to screen the convoy from the attacking German destroyers. They started off the engagement with each other at around 10,000 yd. They traded fire with the Germans as the convoy tried to retreat to safety. The British destroyer Amazon was hit twice by German guns and received moderate damage. A spread of torpedoes was fired at the convoy and found a target at 14:30 sinking the only Soviet merchant ship in the convoy the Tsiolkovski. At 17:50 the German destroyers retired their convoy pursuit and turned to hunt down Edinburgh.

May 2, 1942

Edinburgh was spotted east of the convoy at 6:17 limping along at two knots. The Foresight and Forester were escorting her along with 4 British minesweepers and a Soviet guard ship the Rubin that met up with the group from Murmansk. Edinburgh was being towed because she could not sail in a straight line, only in circles due to the damage to her propellers and rudder. The lead German destroyer Z7 Hermann Schoemann had been separated from her other two destroyers and decided to close the distance to Edinburgh to launch torpedoes at the group. As the German group was spotted the tow lines that were used to keep Edinburgh sailing in a straight line were cut, causing her to sail in circles as the escorts went to screen the cruiser from the incoming destroyers.

Edinburgh, with no fire control systems due to the damage from the earlier day, sent two salvos toward Hermann Schoemann. The first salvo had missed its target, the second salvo hit Hermann Schoemann in both of her engine rooms. This forced her to turn away from the engagement and to create a smoke screen for her to slip away from the fight.

At 6:45 Z24 and Z25 arrived at the engagement hitting and disabling Forrester. They moved onto Foresight badly damaging her and afterwards launching torpedoes at the two British destroyers. One of these torpedoes had missed its original target and at 6:52 crashed into Edinburgh. The torpedo had hit directly on the opposite side of the first torpedo hit from U-456, which meant only the deck and keel plating were holding the ship from breaking in two.

Aftermath of the Battle

Z24 and Z25 saw the 4 British minesweepers and were scared off by their presence, most likely misjudging the ships' classes and thinking they were a bigger threat than they were. They turned to rejoin their ally who had fled. They reached Hermann Schoemann at 8:15 and Z24 rescued the remaining crew that she could fit. The Herman Schoemann was scuttled and the remaining crew in life rafts were picked up by U-88 and the Germans retreated from the battle.

The decision to abandon ship was given on Edinburgh and she had her crew evacuated to the nearby British minesweepers Harrier and Gossamer who each took around 400 sailors. After Edinburgh was evacuated Harrier tried to scuttle her with her 4-inch guns, but after 20 shots she was still afloat. There were even attempts to drop depth charges near her to no avail. Finally, Foresight launched her last torpedo into her, sending her to the bottom. This sent all 4.5 tons of gold straight to the bottom of the North Sea.

The British destroyers and minesweepers made a safe return to Murmansk and the original convoy would be unsuccessfully attacked by two more U-boats to no success finally making it to Iceland. The only casualties were the Edinburgh, her gold, and the Tsiolkovski merchant vessel.

What happened to the gold?

The gold aboard Edinburgh was of great importance to the British government after the war and they were keen on recovering that gold from the sea floor. In 1954 the British government awarded the salvage rights to Risdon Beazley Ltd. This salvage operation was halted due to rising tensions between the Soviet Union and the West.

However, in the 1970s, the price of gold spiked, renewing the desire to recover the gold. So, the British returned to the wreck to recover the gold. Utilizing state-of-the-art equipment, the divers descended to the wreck, which was 800 ft deep, and were able to locate 431 of the 465 gold ingots aboard the vessel. The haul, valued at forty million pounds at the time of recovery, served as the primary motivation for the British to find this gold in the Edinburgh. In 1985, a further 29 bars were recovered, leaving 5 unaccounted for.

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Reference

Tucker, Spencer. World War II at sea an encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012.

Could the 1941 Pearl Harbor Attack have been Averted?

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was a very complex operation that required precise information about the movement and disposition of the US Pacific Fleet, based at Hawaii. This information was gathered on the ground by a spy named Takeo Yoshikawa, who cabled regular reports to Tokyo. These reports proved to be invaluable to the success of the Japanese attack. However, this constant supply of information almost gave the game away.

Here, Alan Bardos, author of a related novel: Amazon US | Amazon UK, considers whether the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been avoided.

During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the West Virginia was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs.

Our Man in Hawaii

The US Pacific Fleet moved from its bases on the West Coast of America to Pearl Harbor in 1940, so the Japanese consequently had very little information about it. The sailing of their fleet over 3,500 miles from home waters to Hawaii was a massive undertaking that required their ships to be refueled numerous times en route. Before taking such a risk they therefore needed to know what was waiting for them when they arrived and the best time to attack.

Bureau 3 (Intelligence) of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s General Staff attached Takeo Yoshikawa to the Japanese Consulate-General in Honolulu. His mission was to gather news about Pearl Harbor. His orders were vague and were constantly refined by further instructions from his superiors in Tokyo.

Yoshikawa meticulously gathered vital intelligence on the movements of the US Pacific Fleet and Hawaii’s defenses. He spent his days travelling between various observation points around Hawaii, reconnoitering airfields and the US Fleet. Changing his clothes several times through the course of the day, he would blend in as anyone from a tourist to a Filipino-American laborer. Yoshikawa even took geisha girls as cover on sightseeing flights over Pearl Harbor. Postcards he supplied were found in the cockpits of Japanese aircraft shot down over Pearl Harbor. Crucially, Yoshikawa was said to have discovered that Sunday mornings were the best time to attack, when the Fleet was home from maneuvers.

Yoshikawa communicated this information regularly to Tokyo through commercial American telegraph companies. In the run up to the attack Tokyo’s need for information increased steadily, to the extent that Yoshikawa was reporting the US Fleet’s movements on a daily basis, leaving a large paper trail of his activities.

The number of cables sent by the Japanese Consulate hadn’t gone unnoticed and Robert L. Shivers, the FBI’s Special Agent In Charge in Hawaii tried to persuade the cable companies to share the coded messages with him but they refused, not wishing to break Federal Law.

Magic intercepts

American Intelligence had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and were regularly intercepting and decrypting Japanese diplomatic traffic, as part of a program code named Magic. This used a machine code named Purple to decode these messages, which were then translated manually. The Americans were therefore aware that war was coming in the Pacific, but only knew as much as Japan’s diplomats, who were not informed in any detail of their Military’s plans. The US Army and Navy Departments in Washington did issue war warnings to their Pacific commanders, but the warnings were consequently vague and did not suggest that Hawaii would be a target.

Faced with an overwhelming amount of decrypted information, American Intelligence focused their efforts on translating the high level communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Washington, which was conducting peace talks with the American government. This did eventually provide a warning of a coming attack, but it did not say where it would be.

Dorothy Edgers and the deferred intercepts

Yoshikawa’s telegram’s to Tokyo gave precisely this information, but as Hawaii was considered a diplomatic backwater, they were left untranslated in the “deferred” pile until one bored newbie in the Naval Cryptographic Section decided to look at them.

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, a former school teacher in Japan, had been working as a translator for two weeks when she found herself in the office on a Saturday morning. She had nothing to do, but was eager to be involved in this strange new world of signals intelligence and started to translate the Hawaii decrypts.

She struck gold immediately realizing the importance of the correspondence between Yoshikawa and Tokyo. Enwrapped, Mrs. Edgers translated telegram after telegram that gave away the military secrets of her country, from real time movements of its battleships, to the lack of torpedo nets protecting them, to the position of the airfields tasked with defending them. This was clearly more than the routine reports of a sidelined diplomat in a backwater, but information for a full-scale attack.

Mrs. Edgers reported her findings to her immediate supervisor Chief Ship’s Clerk Bryant. He saw their significance, but it was Saturday and they were finishing at 12:00pm so he told her it would wait until next week.

Not put off, Dorothy Edgers continued to translate the decrypted messages, waiting in the office for the return of the Translation Branch chief, Captain Alvin Kramer, who had been making his rounds delivering the latest high priority Magic Intercepts. Mrs. Edgers briefed Kramer on what she’d found and was reprimanded for her trouble.

Tired and with a number of other conflicting priorities, Kramer was annoyed that she worked late after the office had closed and was unhappy about the quality of her translation. He dismissed her in no uncertain terms and she was told once again that it would wait until next week.

Ordinarily, Bryant and Kramer would have been right, but on this occasion it was the day before the Pearl Harbor attack.

December 7th 1941 - A date that will live in infamy

The next day, on reviewing the priority daily intercepts between Tokyo and their Embassy in Washington, Kramer saw things were clearly coming to a head. Tokyo had instructed its delegation to end their negotiations at 1pm precisely.

Kramer had been stationed in Hawaii and knew that 1pm in Washington was dawn in Hawaii, and worked out what time 1pm would be at all the US bases in the Pacific, with it being a few hours before dawn in the Philippines.

He passed his findings onto Commander McCollum and Captain Wilkinson, his superiors in the Office of Naval Intelligence. They took them to Admiral Stark the Chief of Naval Operations, who was not overly impressed, but after further discussion and consulting with General Marshall, his opposite number in the Army, Stark agreed to issue an alert to his bases in the Pacific. However, due to atmospheric conditions, they were unable to send the warning to Hawaii and it was sent as a low priority telegram and arrived just after the attack had finished.

They believed that the main threat they were facing was an amphibious landing in the Philippines, where it would be the optimum time for that type of attack and there were also reports of Japanese ships moving in that direction. Had Yoshikawa’s reports been more widely distributed, a very different conclusion might have been reached.

Admiral Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the man blamed for the attack categorically argued that had he been aware of the Hawaiian decrypts, he would have been better prepared to counter the surprise attack. That was certainly the findings of a subsequent congressional investigation.

Many of the events depicted in this article inspired my novel ‘Rising Tide’, which can be purchased here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Book full name: Rising Tide (Daniel Nichols Spy Thrillers Book 1) eBook : Bardos, Alan : Kindle Store

References

Japan's Spy at Pearl Harbor: Memoir of an Imperial Navy Secret Agent, Takeo Yoshikawa, McFarland (2 Mar. 2020).

The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor, Ladislas Farago, Westholme Publishing; Reprint edition (25 Oct. 2012).

A Matter of Honor: Pearl Harbor: Betrayal, Blame, and a Family's Quest for Justice, by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, Harper; Reprint edition (15 Nov. 2016).

Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack, by Steve Twomey, Simon & Schuster; Illustrated edition (1 Nov. 2016).

Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness, by Craig Nelson, Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 1st Edition (10 Nov. 2016).

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1960/december/top-secret-assignment

What if Mohandas, “Mahatma” Gandhi had not been assassinated?

On January 30, 1948, the world mourned the loss of one of its greatest advocates for peace and nonviolence, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, affectionately known as Mahatma Gandhi. His assassination sent shockwaves through India and the rest of the world, leaving many to ponder the question: What if Gandhi had not been assassinated?

Terry Bailey considers this question.

Mahatma Gandhi in 1942.

Before delving into the hypothetical, it's crucial to understand the profound impact Gandhi had during his lifetime. His philosophy of nonviolent resistance, or Satyagraha, not only played a major role in India's independence movement but also inspired countless civil rights and freedom movements worldwide. Gandhi's teachings on ahimsa, (nonviolence) and his emphasis on social justice continue to resonate with people across generations.

If Gandhi had not been assassinated, his presence would have significantly influenced post-independence India's political landscape. At the time of his death, India was grappling with religious and political tensions, particularly between Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi's vision for a united, pluralistic India would have likely shaped policies and initiatives aimed at fostering harmony and inclusivity.

Gandhi was a staunch advocate for economic self-sufficiency and rural development. His promotion of khadi, (hand-spun cloth) and cottage industries was aimed to empower rural communities and reduce dependence on imported goods. Had Gandhi lived longer, he might have spearheaded initiatives to strengthen India's rural economy and bridge the urban-rural divide, emphasizing sustainable development practices.

Reforms

Another area where Gandhi's prolonged presence could have made a significant impact is in social reforms and equality. He championed the rights of marginalized communities, including Dalits, (formerly known as untouchables) and women. Gandhi's advocacy for social justice would likely have continued, influencing policies and societal norms to address caste discrimination, gender inequality, and other social injustices.

Beyond India's borders, Gandhi's influence on international relations and peace building would have been profound. His principles of nonviolence and dialogue could have played a crucial role in resolving conflicts and promoting peaceful coexistence among nations. Gandhi's leadership on global platforms would have amplified calls for disarmament, human rights, and environmental stewardship.

However, it's essential to acknowledge that Gandhi's continued presence would not have been without challenges and opposition. His ideologies faced criticism from various quarters, including radical factions and those advocating for more aggressive approaches to governance and conflict resolution. Navigating these differing viewpoints while staying true to his principles would have been a delicate balance for Gandhi.

Legacy

Even without the hypothetical scenario of Gandhi surviving beyond 1948, his legacy has endured, albeit in different ways. His teachings and philosophy continue to inspire movements for justice, equality, and peace worldwide. Gandhi's emphasis on individual and collective responsibility for social change still remains relevant in addressing contemporary challenges.

It cannot be more over stated that the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi robbed the world of a visionary leader whose influence extended far beyond his lifetime. Imagining a world where Gandhi had not been assassinated offers interesting insight into the potential trajectories of India's development, global peace efforts, and social justice movements. While we can only speculate on what might have been, Gandhi's teachings continue to guide and inspire people in their quests for a better world, reminding us of the enduring power of nonviolence, truth, and compassion.

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What if President John F. Kennedy had not been assassinated?

What if? In this case, (what if?), refers to John F Kennedy. As we ask this  question; what if John F Kennedy had not been assassinated? This intriguing question suggests an immense train of thought.

Terry Bailey considers the question.

President John F. Kennedy just before being assassinated.

Certain events in history stand out as key periods in time, especially for those individuals who lived through those times when particular events actually took place. The assassination of John F Kennedy is one such moment in time. It is said that many individuals can tell you where and what they were doing when the news broken.

The assassination of John F. Kennedy, the charismatic leader of the United States of America, (USA), on that fateful day in 1963, remains etched in collective memory. Yet, what if the tragic event had never occurred? What if Kennedy had continued to guide America through the tumultuous decade that followed?

In this speculative exploration we take a journey into a possible alternate scenario where Kennedy's leadership endured, thus able to ponder the potential ramifications and the enduring legacy of a leader untouched by an assassin's bullet.

To envision a world where John F. Kennedy survives, we must first grasp the landscape of his presidency. Kennedy, renowned for his eloquence, charisma, and vision, steered the USA, through a period marked by Cold War tensions, economic upheaval, and social transformation. His presidency was defined by initiatives aimed at fostering international cooperation, advancing civil rights, and navigating the intricacies of global politics.

Had Kennedy not fallen victim to assassination, his continued leadership would have undoubtedly left an indelible mark not only on American society but also the world stage.

His commitment to diplomacy and dialogue might have ushered in a new era of détente, easing tensions between East and West and laying the groundwork for more peaceful coexistence. Moreover, his advocacy for civil rights could have spurred further progress in addressing systemic injustices and promoting equality both at home and abroad.

Global influence

Economic policies under Kennedy's stewardship might have focused on bolstering infrastructure, investing in education, and fostering innovation, thereby fueling economic growth and prosperity. His ambitious vision for space exploration, exemplified by the lunar landing mission, could have inspired renewed scientific and technological advancements, shaping the future of humanity's exploration of the cosmos, which has only been realized today.

The ripple effects of Kennedy's continued leadership would have reverberated far beyond America’s borders, influencing geopolitical dynamics and reshaping international relations. His emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism might have led to greater cooperation among nations, averting conflicts and forging alliances based on shared interests and mutual respect.

In the realm of nuclear disarmament, Kennedy's unwavering commitment to arms control agreements could have hastened progress towards a safer, more secure world, reducing the specter of nuclear annihilation that loomed large during the Cold War era. His adept handling of national and International dilemmas, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, could have set a precedent for defusing tensions and resolving conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.

Moreover, Kennedy's advocacy for human rights and democracy may have inspired movements for freedom and self-determination around the globe, challenging authoritarian regimes and promoting the spread of democratic ideals. His leadership would have provided a beacon of hope for those striving for liberty and justice, amplifying the voices of the oppressed and marginalized.

Conclusion

In contemplating the hypothetical continuation of Kennedy's presidency, one cannot overlook the enduring legacy he would have left behind. His vision, courage, and charisma captured the imagination of millions, inspiring future generations to pursue noble ideals and strive for a better world. His tragic and early death robbed the world of a leader whose potential remained largely untapped, leaving behind a legacy tinged with unfulfilled promises and lingering questions of what might have been.

Yet, even in the realm of conjecture, Kennedy's legacy endures as a testament to the power of leadership in shaping the course of history. His words still resonate, his deeds still inspire, and his vision still beckons us forward towards a brighter future. In the end, whether in reality or in speculation, John F. Kennedy stands as a towering figure in the pantheon of great leaders, reminding us of the boundless possibilities that await those who dare to dream and strive for greatness.

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What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had not been Assassinated?

Few events in history have had such far-reaching consequences as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo. This single act of violence set off a chain reaction that led to the First World War, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the world. However, what if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated? What alternate course might history have taken? Delving into the speculative realm of "what ifs" we can consider the potential ramifications of a world where the Archduke either was not assassinated or survived the assassination attempt.

Terry Bailey considers this question.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

The first and most immediate consequence of Franz Ferdinand's survival would have been the avoidance or delay of the First World War. His assassination served as the catalyst for the conflict, prompting Austria-Hungary to issue an ultimatum to Serbia, which in turn led to a series of alliances being invoked, drawing Europe into a devastating war. Without this trigger, the delicate balance of power that existed among the European nations might have persisted, potentially averting the catastrophic conflict that claimed millions of lives.

With the potential avoidance of the First World War, the geopolitical landscape of Europe would have remained vastly different than we understand it today. The collapse of empires such as the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian, and German would not have occurred in the same manner, altering the course of history for countless nations and peoples. The rise of communism in Russia, the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent economic turmoil that paved the way for the Second World War, all these pivotal events might have been drastically different or potentially avoided altogether.

One of the key factors in Franz Ferdinand's assassination was the simmering ethnic tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Archduke, who was heir to the throne, advocated for a federalist solution that would grant greater autonomy to the empire's various ethnic groups. Had he lived, Franz Ferdinand may have pursued these reforms more aggressively, seeking to defuse the ethnic tensions that ultimately led to his assassination. His vision of a more inclusive and decentralized empire could have laid the groundwork for greater stability and harmony within Austria-Hungary.

Diplomacy

Furthermore, Franz Ferdinand was known for his pragmatism and skepticism towards war. Unlike some of his more hawkish counterparts within the Austrian government, he favored diplomatic solutions over military intervention. His survival could have shifted the course of Austrian foreign policy towards a more conciliatory stance, reducing the likelihood of conflicts that could escalate into global wars.

Beyond Europe, the survival of Franz Ferdinand could have had significant implications for the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. With Austria-Hungary's focus redirected towards internal reforms and diplomatic solutions, the empire might have been less inclined to support the Central Powers during the First World War. This could have weakened the Ottoman Empire's position and altered the outcome of events such as the Armenian Genocide and the subsequent partitioning of the Middle East by European powers.

Moreover, the survival of Franz Ferdinand could have influenced the trajectory of the United States' involvement in global affairs. Without the impetus of the First World War, the United States might have remained more isolationist, avoiding the entanglements that ultimately drew it into the international arena. The absence of American intervention could have altered the balance of power during the war and shaped the subsequent peace negotiations in unforeseen ways.

Technology and culture

In the realm of technology and culture, the avoidance of a World War could have led to different innovations and artistic movements. The war,  as all wars do, spurred advancements in military technology and medicine, but it also brought about immense human suffering and destruction. In a world where the First World War never occurred, resources that were diverted towards military efforts could have been invested in other areas, potentially accelerating scientific progress for peaceful means, in addition to, cultural developments.

Naturally, it is impossible to predict with certainty how history would have unfolded if Archduke Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated. The interconnectedness of events and the myriad factors at play make any speculation inherently hypothetical. However, by examining the potential consequences of a non-assassination or his survival, we gain insight into the pivotal role that individuals can play in shaping the course of history and the profound impact that seemingly small events can have on the world stage.

In conclusion, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria set off a chain reaction that led to the First World War and its far-reaching consequences. However, by considering the hypothetical scenario where Franz Ferdinand survived, we glimpse a different path, one where war and upheaval might have been averted, and the course of history irrevocably altered. While we can only speculate on the details of such an alternate reality, the exercise serves as a reminder of the fragility and complexity of human history.

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The Polish Army’s World War 2 Bear Soldier

World War 2 has many unpleasant tales, but occasionally a tale isn’t so unpleasant. Here, Lior Bouchnik looks at how a bear came to be part of the Polish Army – and even helped in a major battle.

Wojtek the bear with a Polish soldier during World War II.

It all starts at the opening shot of the Second World War. 1939 - the invasion of Poland by Germany and the USSR and the following annexation left millions of formally Polish citizens under Soviet authority. In 1942, amid the deportation of thousands of Polish civilians, the Ander’s Army was formed, a common name for the Polish armed forces in the east. Ander’s army accompanied the deported Polish citizens to Iran which became a refugee camp that received up to 2,500 people per day, and in total 116,000.

On April 8, 1942, the Polish soldiers stationed in Iran brought with them was the 18-year-old niece of General Bolesław Długoszowski who persuaded her uncle to buy a small Syrian bear cub from a young Iranian boy. The boy claimed that he found the cub after the bear's mother was shot by hunters. The young cub accompanied the soldiers and was given the name Wojtek, an old Slavic name that loosely translates to “happy warrior”. The cub grew into a bear on the campaign and as he grew, he became more than just a mascot to the Polish soldiers. The cub learned to adapt as he lived among them, imitating their actions. Wojtek learned to salute and he even started standing on his hind legs and marching beside them. Wojtek also developed a love for drinking beer and eating cigarettes, but he would only eat lit ones otherwise he would refuse to consume them. He and the soldiers enjoyed wrestling together and on cold nights he would sleep with them.

Battle of Monte Cassino

Wojtek moved with the 22nd Artillery Supply Company all around the Middle East. First, they moved to Iraq then Syria, Palestine, and finally Egypt, and when it came time for his major contribution in the Battle of Monte Cassino, he weighed 90 kilograms (200 pounds). The Polish soldiers of the 2nd Polish Corps were tasked with joining the British 8th Army in the campaign to liberate Italy. By now Wojtek developed a close bond with his human companions, who treated him like a fellow soldier, and when they were told that the designated ship that was supposed to carry them to Italy forbade mascots and pets, they did what they felt was the only natural step. To account for his rations and transportation Wojtek was officially enlisted as a soldier. He was listed among the soldiers with his given name, he had his own serial number and pay book. He lived with the other soldiers in tents or in a special wooden crate, which was transported by truck.

In the 1944 Battle of Monte Cassino, Wojtek continued to showcase his learned behavior by helping his unit move heavy ammunition onto trucks. Wojtek helped the soldiers by carrying himself 45 kg (100 Ib) crates of 11 kg (25 Ib) artillery shells that normally required four men. Wojtek helped to speed up the loading process, and the positive effect on the soldier's morale did not go unnoticed. His efforts earned him a promotion to the rank of corporal. Wojtek was later immortalized by the 22nd Artillery Supply Company by becoming their official emblem, showcasing a depiction of a bear carrying an artillery shell.

After the war

 After the war in 1947, Wojtek was given to Edinburgh Zoo where he spent the rest of his life. He was often visited by his former Polish comrades who threw him cigarettes to eat like he used to do in their shared time in the army. Wojtek died on December 2, 1963, aged 21, weighing nearly 500 kg (1,100 pounds) and being over 1.8 m (5 ft 11 in) tall. Wojtek's legacy is one of family. In the war ridden world of the 1940s, Wojtek was much like the Polish soldiers who lost their homes, and what started as a mere amusement to the soldiers became real comradery. The Polish soldiers gave Wojtek a family and he returned the favor in equal measure, by boosting morale, by being one of them. In what must be one of the most unique stories of the war, soldiers found a true comrade who didn’t have a flag or a nation to fight for, just a group of Polish soldiers who became his only family.

Now read about the cat that survived 3 ships sinking during World War 2 here.

More from Lior can be found here.

Myron Taylor: A Man on a Mission

Thomas Carlyle once opined that “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.”  And that is certainly true in the case of Myron C. Taylor, whose consequential life helps explain a great deal about the 20th Century.

Taylor was born in 1874, and grew up in the small, upstate town of Lyons (in Wayne County), just south of Lake Ontario. Taylor went to the Cornell Law School in Ithaca, graduating with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1894.  Returning to Lyons, he established a small law practice, but shortly transitioned to helping his father’s tannery business.  That quickly led to bigger things.

Taylor soon became America’s leading industrialist: first as the “czar” of the textile industry; and later, in the 1920s and 30s, as CEO of U.S. Steel.  Thereafter, he became a key diplomatic participant in some of the most important geopolitical events of the World War II era.  Taylor is little remembered today, however, because of his intense personal dislike for self-promotion and publicity; for much of his business career, the national media called him “the man nobody knows.”

C. Evan Stewart explains.

Myron Taylor in the Vatican. Image provided by the author.

Ambassador Extraordinary

Having literally saved U.S. Steel from ruin during the depths of the Depression and then restoring it to its position as the country’s most important corporation, Taylor stepped down as CEO in April of 1938; he hoped to enter a “sabbatical period of life” with his wife, Anabel.  But his friend, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked him to take on an assignment: could Taylor help solve the crisis of Jews who were attempting to flee persecution in Nazi Germany.  Taylor’s efforts actually led to a deal with Hitler and Germany, whereby 150,000 “able-bodied” Jews were to be permitted to emigrate, with their dependents to follow later.  Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles told the president it was “better than we hoped for.”  Unfortunately, with the Nazi invasion of Poland (which led to World War II), that deal came to naught.

Then, right before Christmas 1939, FDR called on Taylor again, asking him to be the president’s personal representative to Pope Pius XII (with the rank of “Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary”). This very controversial appointment, which FDR undertook for multiple reasons (e.g., domestic politics; his wanting a third term; trying to influence Church policy (and its internal politics) in the United States; getting international-diplomatic information at the Vatican; influencing the Vatican on geopolitical issues; etc.), led to what was widely known as the “Taylor Mission.”  And in fulfilling that Mission over the next eleven years, Taylor was at the heart many of the era’s critical matters, including: (i) efforts to keep Italy, Spain, and Portugal out of the war on the Axis side; (ii) ensuring that Lend-Lease aid got to the Soviet Union in 1941, which at that point was about to be overrun by the German army; (iii) bringing the first documented proof of the Holocaust to the Vatican in September of 1942; (iv) ensuring that the Church would support the Allies’ policy of unconditional surrender (and later, not break with that policy); (v) helping to broker Italy’s surrender and Mussolini’s departure; (vi) blocking German attempts to have the Vatican broker a peace; (vii) helping to godfather the Bretton Woods agreement and the United Nations; (viii) almost single-handedly helping Italy recover from the war; and (ix) under President Truman, engaging in an effort to have all the world’s religions unite against atheistic communism (i.e., the Soviet Union).

Lend-Lease to Russia

To cover all the foregoing (and more), readers will have to pick up Myron Taylor: The Man Nobody Knows (Twelve Tables Press).  For the remainder of this article, the focus will be on Taylor’s critical role in ensuring Lend-Lease aid got to Russia in 1941.

On March 11, 1941, FDR signed the controversial Lend-Lease legislation. Premised on the president’s campaign pledge in 1940 for America to be the “great arsenal of democracy,” it was understood - by Congress and the American public - to apply only to providing assistance to Great Britain, then isolated and under the German attacks known as the “Blitz.”

On June 24, 1941, the geopolitical world was up-ended when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.  The German army’s advance through Russian territory was swift; FDR and his top advisors feared that the if the USSR were to be overrun and conquered, then stopping the Nazi regime when (not if) the United States became a belligerent might well provide impossible. (Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, told FDR that Russia might not last three months.)  The president was determined to provide substantial military assistance to Joseph Stalin, but there was a very significant roadblock.

In 1937, the Vatican had issued the Encyclical Divini Redemptoris - issued by Pope Pius XI (but authored by his Secretary of State, who would succeed him as Pope Pius XII).  That Encyclical condemned in no uncertain terms the Soviet Union and expressly forbade all Catholics from having anything to do with supporting that nation-state. Given the 1937 Encyclical and the strong isolationistic sentiments of many American Catholics, FDR feared that the political backlash would prove too great if he tried to extend Lend-Lease aid to Russia.  (For example, the Bishop of Buffalo had publicly stated that Catholics would be justified in not serving in the U.S. military if the country were allied with the Soviet Union.)  In the words of Robert Sherwood (an FDR speechwriter and later biographer), “[a]s a measure for coping with serious Catholic opposition to aid for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt decided to send Myron C. Taylor … on another mission to Rome.”

Myron Taylor shares a letter from FDR with the Pope. Image provided by the author.

Threading the Needle

Before his trip, Taylor, together with two Church officials in the United States and Sumner Welles, devised a strategy to thread the needle of the 1937 Encyclical: that any U.S. aid would not constitute supporting communism, but would instead be directed at alleviating the suffering of the Russian people, for whom the Pope and the Church always had special affection.  But that nuanced approach to the problem got off to a rocky start at Taylor’s first meeting with the Pope on September 9, 1941.  FDR had asked Taylor to present a hand-written letter to the Pope, a document which went to great lengths to assure him that “the churches in Russia are open” and that “freedom of religion” was a likely outcome of the Nazi’s invasion.  The Pope and his advisors were incredulous; at least seven Vatican memoranda were prepared in response to FDR’s letter, many of them questioning the president’s mental state and his grasp on reality.

Notwithstanding FDR’s blunder, Taylor, over a number of days and multiple sessions with the Pope and his advisors, was able to get the Vatican to agree to the concept of delinking the Russian people from the Soviet Union; but this message could not be seen as being issued from or dictated by the Pope or the Vatican.  Instead, guidance would be sent to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to have the message delivered by a high-ranking member of the Church in America.

Once Taylor returned to America, in consultation with the Apostolic Delegate and other Church officials, it was decided to effectuate the Vatican’s hidden-hand strategy by having an outspoken isolationistic Church leader - Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati - deliver the message.  With time of the essence - not only were German troops closing in on Moscow, but a second Lend-Lease appropriations bill was pending in Congress and over 90% of available Lend-Lease funds had already been allocated - McNicholas was summoned to Washington and given his marching orders.

On October 30, 1941, McNicholas published a pastoral letter (which received broad national coverage and was printed in toto in the Congressional Record) explicitly endorsing the need for America to help the “persecuted people of Russia, deprived of freedom and put in bondage.”  That same day, FDR cabled Stalin that he had approved $1 billion of war materials to be shipped to the USSR.  But the president waited a week for the McNicholas letter to sink in and take effect in the American body politic (and Congress).  As Sherwood wrote: “It is an indication of Roosevelt’s concern for public opinion that he did not formerly include the Soviet Union among the recipients of Lend Lease until November 7.”

In the words of the leading historian on the decision to aid the USSR in 1941, because of “Myron Taylor’s special mission to the Vatican” - which had secured the Church’s overt approval of such aid, “[s]o perished the great dread of the President that the encyclical of Pius XI would provide a sanction for equating aid to Russia with aid to communism and thereby permit his opponents to insist with telling force that his program was in conflict with the doctrines of the Church.”  Ultimately, eleven billion dollars in aid was sent to the Soviet Union to help them repulse the Nazis.  And at the Tehran Conference, Stalin toasted that, without the U.S.’s war materials, the USSR would have been overrun.  In reflecting upon Taylor’s contribution to this historic result (which was “given no great amount of publicity”), Sherwood wrote: “Taylor was one who truly deserved the somewhat archaic title of ‘Ambassador Extraordinary.’”

The Taylor Archives

Myron C. Taylor donated his papers to his alma mater, Cornell University, and I drew upon these papers (in the University’s Olin Library) for this article.  Other archival sources with important Taylor documents include the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library to Independence, Missouri; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; and the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; in addition, the Baker Library at Harvard University (papers of Thomas Lamont) and the Oral History Project at Columbia University (including oral histories of Frances Perkins, George Rublee, etc.) contain many valuable materials on Taylor’s life and career.  The Vatican has made many, but not all, archival materials covering the World War II era available for scholars.

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